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Abstract: This paper describes a new cryptographic digital sigrrature scheme based on Mandelbrot and
Julia fractal sets. Having fractal based digital signatureicheme is possible due to the strong connection
between the Mandelbrot and Julia fractal sets. The link between the two fractal sets used for the
conversion of the private key to the public key. Mandelbrot fractal firnction takes the chosen private
key as the input parameter and generates the corresponding public-key. Julia fractal function then used
to.sign the message with receiver's public key and veriff the received message based on the receiver'sprivate key. The propose scheme was resistant against affacks, utilizes t-all k"y size and performs
comparatively faster than the existing DSA, RSA digital signature scheme. fractat digital signature
scheme was an attractive alternative to the taditional number theory digital signature *.ti"...
Keywords: Fractals Cryptography, Digital Signahne Scheme, Mandelbrot Fractal Set. and Julia
Fractal Set
INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is the science of information
security. Cryptographic system in turn, is grouped
according to the type of the key system: symmetric(secret-key) algorithms which utilizes the same key (see
Fig. l) for both encryption and decryption process, and
asymmetric (public-key) algorithms which uses
different, but mathematically connected, keys for
encryption and decryption (see Fig. 2). In general,
cryptography protocol employs public-key algorithm to
exchange the secret key and then uses faster iymmetric
algorithms to ensure secrecy of the data strear; lr'21.
Public-key scherne is based on the idea that a user
can possess two keys, one key is known to the public
Td ft9 other is private to rhe owner. The public-key
algorithm uses the pubtic key to encrypt the data to be
sent, and then at the recipient side, uses the private key
to decrypt the ciphered data. Digital signature is a
verification mechanism based on the public-key scheme
that is focusing on message authenticity. The output of
the signature process is called the digital signature t21.
Digital signatures are then used to provide
authentication of the associated input, which is called a
message t3' 41(see Fig. 3). In digitaf signature pubtic-key
algorithms, the private key is used to sign i m"rsage,
while the public key is used to verift the authenticity of
the message.
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Fig. l: Secret-key scheme.
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Fig. 2: Public-key scheme.
Digital signatures scheme used to provide the following
t4t.-
o Data integnty (the assurance that data has not been
changed by unauthori zed party).
o Message authentication (the assurance that the
source of data is as claimed).
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. Non-repudiation (the assurance that an entity
cannot deny commitments).
In 1976, The first notion of a digital signature
scheme was given by Whitflreld Diffre and Martin
Hellman, although at that time they only conjectured
the existence ofsuch scheme tt'ul' Soon after that, in
1978, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman invented the first
dieital sisnature scheme which is calted RSA digital
siinature-algorithm I7l. Subsequently, there are a few
more proposed digital sign-ature algorithms such as
ElGamal signature-sch"."- Itl, Undeniable signature [el
and others.
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1960's the modern computer graphics era had shed new
light on the study of iterated function,.which soon gave
the birth to the freld of fractal geometrics.
Fractal was made famous by Mandelbrot. In fact,
the word fractal itself was coined by Benoit Mandelbrot
in 1960. The word fractal came from a Latin word
"fractus" meaning "broken" or "fractured". As defined
by Benoit, fractal is a fragment of geometric shape,
cieated interactively from almost similar but smaller
components (some changes in scale). ,E qm another;i;*di"t, fr;tats are inigular in shape tt3' roJ,and theydo not cohere with the typical mathematical
dimensions. One of the unique things about fractals is
that they have no integer dimension, instead they have a
real and a imaginary part as described earlier. Because
of the imaginfi pait,-generally fractal can be classified
into two types: fiactaf curves, in which the dimension
of the fraital curves fall between the first and second
dimensions (1-D and' 2-D), and fractal surface, in which
shapes have a dimension between the second and third
dimlension (2-D and 3-D). There is another kind of
fractal that is called "fractal dimensions" which can fall
between the 0.64th to the l.58th dimensions of the non-
integer dimension [r5l. The fractal dimension is a
statiitical quantrty that shows how the fractal is filling
the space dompletely during the zooms down to finer
scalei. There are many applications of fractal. One
major example is the use of fractal to create a realistic
image of nature such as the image of clouds, snow
flakes, frrngi, bacteria, mountain;",Ittet networks,
systems of blood vessels and others t''""r.
Julia and Mandelbrot Fractal Sets: Other than
imitating the image of nature, fractal geometry has also
permeated many area of science, such as astronomy,
fhysics, and biological sciences. Fractal geometry has
alsb been classified as one of thq.^post important
tichniques in computer graphics tr2l. one bf ttre
interesiing fractal s'ets is the Julia fractal set. Julia
fractal sei(see Fig. 4), developed by Gaston Julia trol, is
the set of points on a complex plane. Julia fractal image
can be created by iterating the recursive Julia function
(see Equation 3). Later in 1982, Benoit Mandelbfo1
)xpand6d his ideis in ttre tactat g'eometry of nature [r0l
byrefining the Julia frac0al set. He was lookiqg &t thg
cirnnection on the value c from the Julia fractal
equation [lal. As the result, Mandelbrot- fractal was
defined, and it was defined as the set of points on a
complex plane by applying Equation 4 iteratively (see
Fig.-5). Although Mandelbrot fractal set iterates z2 + c
wiih z starting at 0, and Julia set iterates z2 + c sJarting
with varying non-zero z which is a slight difference
from Mindelbrot equation, but actually they are both
using the same basic fractal equation as_ we can see
from Equation 3 and 4. The connection between
Mandelbiot fractal set and Julia fractal set is that, each
point c in the Mandelbrot is actually 
_specifies the
Leometric structure of a corresponding Julia set. On the
other hand if c is in the Mandelbrot set, the Julia set
will be connected. However, if c is not in the
851
Fig. 3: Digital signature scherne.
This paper proposes a new fractal (based on
Mandelbrot and Julia fractal sets) digital signature
scheme as a secured method to sign and veriff the
coresponding message. The working of t4e proposed
scheme depends on the stror.rg connection between the
Mandelbrot and Julia sets t'or by using th-eir. special
fimctions, Mande!fu and Juliafu functions t"r, which
generate the correiponding private and the public keys.
Fractals: A complex number is a number of the form a
+ bi, where a ina b are 
^real .nrrmbers, and i is theimaeinary unit defuned as i':'I trzr'The real nrunber, a'
is cdnsidired as the real component, and the unit i and b
are considered as the imaginary component of the
complex number. The sum and product of two complex
nunibers are formulated as shown by Equations I and
Equation 2.
(a + b i)+ (c + di): (a+ c) + (b + d) i ; (l)
a,b,d,ceZ;i2 =-1.
(a+bi)x(c+di)=(ac-bd)+(bc+ad)i; e)
ahd,ceZ;i2 =4.
In the late lfth century, Henri Poincar6, Felix
Klein, Pierre Fatou and Gaston Julia used the iterated
function in the complex plane, but their findings- were
dwarfed by the abs-ent df visualization effect. In the
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Mandelbrot set, the Julia set will become a Cantor dust
Z, = Zr_t +C; C, Z, ec;n eZ.
)
Z, = zn_t +c; zo =0; c,zn-t eC;n eZ.
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specified in a U.S. 
.G_.overnment Federal lnformation
Processing_Standard t'4. The algorithm is called Digital
lieryL"f" ltandard (DSS). Fig.6 illustrates the step--s inthe DSA digital signature algorithm. The DSA can be
viewed as a variant of the ElGamal signature scheme.
Both signature schemes are based- on the same
mathematical problan - discrete logarithm problem.
DSA base its s-ecurity on the complexity of thti discLe-te
logarithm problem iri neta of Zo,ihere p is a prims lttl.
(3)
(4)
DIGITAL SIGNATURE
The well known digital sigrrature schemes can be
classified according to the -inherited mathematical
problems. As now, there are three different Np-hardproblems wlrere the most known digital signature
schemes are based from;l lnteger Factorization (IF) schemes. The security in
integer factorization 'schemes are based on -the
gomplexity glthe integer factorization problem.
E;amples of IF scheme impfementation ire RSAdigital signature,,;;heme trl and Rabin digital
signafure scheme l'2. Discrete Logarithm (DL) schemes. DiscretetggrlF- schemes qe based on the complexity of
the discrete logarithm problem in a firiite fi-eld.
Examples._. of DL sc.[-erne implementation are
ElGariral l*1. and DSA tr7t. ---r----------3. e.[ip1ic Cirve 
-(EC) schemes. The security inelliptic cruve schemes are based on the compl6xity
gf the.elliptic curve discrete logarithm prbUteni.
Examples.gf EC scheme is the elliptic curve digital
sigrratiss trEJ.
PSA Digital Signature Algorithm: In 1991, the U.S.National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
proposed the digital signature algorithm (DSAJ aild was
852
Fig. 6: DSA digital signature scheme.
The DSA Algorithms: Key generation algorithm(generated by receiver, Alice)
Alice must do the following (referring to Steps I to 6
on Fig.6):
l. Cho_os-e a prime numbers (p), where 2L-l < p < 2L
for 5 12 < L < 1024 andZ a multiple of 64.2. Choose a prime numbers (q), where q divisor of (p
- 
l), and 2159 < s <2160.3. 
_Coppute g as follbws: s = (h(p-t)/q) modp, wherel<h<(p 
- 
1), and g> l.4. Choose a random integerx, with 0 <.r < q.q. Computey as follows:y : gxmodp.6. Send (p, S, C, andy) to Bob(verifier).
Qigoilg and verifying algorithms: Siping (sender -Alice)
Alice must do the following (referring to Steps 7 to 1l
on Fig. 6):7. Determine the message m to be signed such that:
o<m<p.8. Choose a random integer e, with 0 < k < g.
?. Compute r as follows r : (gkmod p) mod 4.10. Compute s as follows: s-: ((k-i)xGH2-I@)+
xxr)) mod q.Il. The signature is (a s).
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Fig. 4: Julia fractal i
Fig. 5: Mandelbrot fractal image.
265
o Send the signature(r, s) and the message to the
recelver.
o k-I is a multiplicative inverse of k in Zo.
Verifying (receiver - Bob): Bob mus! do the following
(referfrng to Steps 12 and 16 onFig. 6):
12. Obtain the keys (p, q, g, andy).
13. w : s-1 mod 4.
14. uI -- (SHA-I(m)) x w) mod q.
lS. u2 : (r xw) mod q.
16. v: (gul x yu2) modp) mod q.
o If v : r, then the signature is verified.
o Ifv does not equal r, then the message should
be considered as invalid.
RSA Dieital Sisnature Scheme: In the RSA digital
sipnaturJaleoritf,m, the private key is used to sigrr the
mEssage. TXe sigrred message will be send to the
receivEr with the-sender's electronic signature. Fig.7
shows the steps of the RSA digital signahre algorithm.
To verifr the contents of digitally signed data, the
recipient- generates a new veiification key from the
simid meisage that was received, by using his public
k6. and com-Dares the verified value with the original
m6ssage vahie. If the two values match, then the
messaEe is verified and authenticated.
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Fig. 7: RSA digital sigrrature scheme.
The RSA Digital Signature Scheme: Key generation
algorithm (generated by receiver, Bob)
Alice must do the following (referring to Steps I to 5
on Fig. 7):
l. Choose two prime numbers (p, 4) randomly'
secretly, and roughly of the same size.
2. Compute the modulus n as follows:
n:pxq.
3. Compute the <D(n), as follows:
@(n)=(p-I) x (q-1).
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4. Choose the key e, such that 1 < e < cD(n), and
GCD(e, o(nD:r.
5. Compute the Private key d,
such as d : e-I mod @(n).
Signature and verilication algorithms: Signature
(sender - Alice) : Alice must do the following
(referring to Steps 6 to 8 on Fig. 7):
6. Determine the message m to be signed such
that 0<m<n.
7 . Sigr the message as follows, s : md md n.
8. Send the signature s with the message ra to
Bob (receiver).
Verification (receiver - Bob): Bob must do the
following (referring to Steps 9 and 12 on Fig. 7):
9. Obtain the keys (d, n).
10. Obtain s, rr from Alice.
I l. Compute z as follows, u : semodn.
12. Veri$, the message m as follows: m: u-l.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Digital Signature Based on the Mandelbrot and
Julia Fractal Sets: Mandelbrot and Julia fractal shapes
(see Fig. 4 and 5) consists of complex nwnber points,
computed by the recrusive functions as defined eadier
in Subsection 2.1 (Equation 3, and 4). In this Section,
with the aids of Fig. 8, we are going to explain in brief
the proposed idea of the fractal digital signature scheme
based on fractal set. The detail explanation of the
proposed method will be given in the following
Subsection. As mentioned earlier Mandelbrot and Julia
properties were used in the design ofthe new proposed
digital signature scheme.
ln the proposed algorithm, sender and receiver
must agree and use the public domain value, c. The
receiver, Bob, will generate e and n as the private keys,
while the sender, Alice, generates fr and d as her private
keys. Sender and receiver use their private values as
well as the value c as inputs to the Mandelbrot function
to produce the public keys zd and zp. Then Bob and
Alice must exchange their public keys. Alice will
obtain Bob's public key, znd and uses these values
together with her private key and the plaintext, as inputs
to the Julia function to produce the signature s, which
will then send with the message to Bob. Bob must
obtain Alice's public key, zp, the signature s and the
message m from Alice which will be used as input
values together with his own private key to Julia
fimction, to verifr the message v.
853
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lr-oposed Fractal Digital Signature Scheme: ln thefollowing w.e w.1ll desCribe rhe fractal digital signature
scheme in details (see Fig. ll). The first step-of the
prlp9se.d scheme is tg generate the private icey andglblic.key_. by lsing Mandelbrot fiuiction Mindelfu(Equation 7) and Julia tunction Juliafu (Equation 8). -
z (n+ I )- cx f (z (n)) ; z (0)=c; c,z ec;n eZ. 0)
z (n+ 1 )= sy.f (z (n)) ; z(0F y, y,c,z eC;n eZ. 181
As shown in Fig. 8 earlier, fractal digital signatwe
scherne involves a sender and a receiver. The receiver
must generate the public key from the chosen private
key, and then send the public key to the sender. The
sender will then generate his public key by using
Mandelfu firnction and send it to the receiver.
zd = Z,_txc2 xd;z,c,d eC;n eZ. (9)
As indicates by Fig. ll, zd is the generated public
key, generated by the receiver by executing Equation 9
(see Step I ofFig. I l). The receiver's private key is the
value (d, n). Similarly for the sender, with the private
value of (e, k), the sender will produce the
corresponding public key, zp (Step 3 from Fig. ll),
ganerated by using Mandelfn. The Mondelfu is given in
Equation 10.
Zk€= Zr_rxc2 xe;z,c,e eC;k eZ. (10)
In Steps 5 and 6 (Fig. I l), executing Juliafnby the
sender will sign the message m to produce the signature
s. The signature s with the message z, will then send to
the receiver. Similarly (Fig. ll, Step 7), the receiver
will execute Juliafn to produce v which then is used to
veriff the message m (Fig.l l, Step 8).
z(n + I)=cx f(z (n).
f(z(n))= zbrxcxe,z,c,e eC;n eZ.
(s)
(6)
Fig. 8: Fractal digiral signature algorithm.
Mandelfn and Juliafn: The fractal based digital
lignature used a specific Mandelbrot funcIon,
YoP:W.,and similarly, a specific Julia tunction,Juliafu t"t. Fig. 9 and l0 show images which were
generated from the Mandelfu and the Juliafu. ln
Mandelfn and Juliafn functions, we can substitute the
frnction f( ) (see Equation 5 and 6) with well known
functions such as sin( ), cos( ), exp( ), etc. However, the
value-which is generated by Mandelfu must belong to
the Mandelbrot set, and likewise, the value generated
by Juliafu must belong to the Julia set t'0. In the
proposed scheme we setf( ) as shown by Equation 7 for
Mandelfu function and Equation 8 for Juliafu function.
854
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Fig. I l: Fractal digital sigrrature algorithm.
After exchanging the public keys (see Steps 2 and
4 from Fig. ll)-an-d executing the Juliafu.function(Steos 5 anl 7 from Fig. I l), sender Alice and receiver
boU nua completed the proposed secured dig-ital
sienature schenie. The process fi'om Fig. ll, Step 5 is
alio being illustrated by Equation I l. The
conespondi-ng signature process, which is Step 7 of Fig.
I l. is hltherillustrated by Equation 12.
s =ck'' x(zd)oexm; (l l)
s,c,e,d eC; n,x,k eZ; m e R.
v = c*' x (z re),d x m;
v,c,e,d eC; n,x,k eZ; m e R.
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(r2)
produce the signature, s, after executes the Juliafu wlth
input parameters f and d (sender's private key) as
shown by Table 1, Row 5. Table 1, Row 6, shows the
signature of the hashed message M by using the
security hash algorithm SHA-I (ru : SttA-l(M)), after
the Juliafu is executed with parameters n and e
(receiver's private key) by the receiver.
A hash frrnction is a reproducible method of
tuming the data relatively into a small digest. Hastt
function takes a random sized input message to produce
a fixed sized digest. The outcome of the resulted digest
is based on the hash technique used (SIIA-I ,SHA-224,
SHA-256, SIIA-384, and SHA-512, which are designed
by the National Security Agency (NSA) and^published
ty ttre NtSf as a U.S. g-ou"rn-tt t standard) 1221.
Table l: Example of fractals based digital signature
RESTILTS
The chaotic nature of the fractal functions ensures
the secwity of the proposed scheme. However, to
prevent a brute force attack, the choice of the key size
becomes essential. The key space in fractal digital
signature depends on the size of the key. For example
in-tZS Uits liey, there ore 2t28 possible key values, as is
the case in the symmetric scheme. RSA and DSA keys
are basicatly different from fractal keys. The RSA and
DSA atgorithms depend on large prime numbers (see
Fig. 12)r"r. The 128-bit RSA and DSA keys space are
timited by how many primes exist in the finite field of
Zo, where p is the largest prime that can b9 represented
by a 128-bit value. Hence, RSA and DSA keys size
space are considerably smaller than the fractal key
siace for a given finitefield Ia1. Table2 shows the key
size for RSA, DSA and symmetric scheme, regarding to
the resistance to brute force attacks. The keys space for
RSA and DSA were calculated based on the number of
Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme: It is
impossible to mount an attack on the proposed scheme
because of the iteration fr and the variation constant e,
which are unknown to the public. Hence' we can
identify that the hard problem for the proposed fractal
digital signature is through the chaos property of the
fractal firnction which in this case depends on the
private key selection. This is true since the generated
iublic keys (zd and zp) produced by Mandelfu
depands on the number of iterations, n' as well as the
variation constant d and e, which makes the Mandelfu
values jump path chaotically. This will prevent attack
on the private values, given that d and e are being
represented appropriately' We are suggesting the value
of d *d e to be represented by a 128-bit value which
should give 2128 possibilities for every values of n (or ft)
that is being brute force.
Working Example of the Proposed Scheme: Table I
shows a working example of the proposed scheme' In
this example each complex numbe^[,is being represented
by a 64-bit value. We use GMP I2u to simulate the 64-
bit complex numbers. In this example, the public
information, c, is initialized to a complex value
(-0.022134) + (-0.044)r, and variable.x is initialized to
3. The value ofx is used to reduce the final calculation,
see Equation 13 and Equation 14. The value x can be
set to 0, ifdesired.
At the beginning, receiver and sender need to
choose their private keys (see Table 1, Row 2). Then
they have to calculate the corresponding public keys by
using the Mandelbrot function, Mandelfu, as shown by
Tabli l, Row 3. These values are zd (receiver's public
key) and zp (sender's public key). Table l, Row 4,
shows both parties exchanging their public keys.
Following this process is the calculation of the
signature by using Julia function, Juliafn. Sender will
85s
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primes existed for particula^r.key sizes. The computation
was based on Eqr.ration l3trt1.
No. of prime in[0,n)=n/logn; neZ. (13)
Perl'ormance evaluation based on equivalent key
sizes for fractal and digital signature lchemes: We
compare the perfbrmance of the fractal based disital
signature scheme against the well known RSA;d
DSA digital signature schemes. Table 3 shows the
performance of fractal, RSA and DSA dieital sisnature
approaches. These algorithms were code-d in firUo C
with GMP library, and nur on a computer with 1.6 GHz
Intel@ M Pentium processor and 256MB RAM. Also.
we used Miller-Rabin algorithm t,tl fo. primality test
which was coded using C and GMp.
The comparison between fractal, RSA and DSA
digital signature schemes show that fiactal key digital
signature performs better than RSA and DSd in
general. Note that, in our implementation we increased
the number of iterations k and n (see Fig. I I )proportionate with the key size to get suitable
comparisons as shown by Fig. 13, 14, 15, and 16. As
those Figure indicate, the fractal based dieital sisnature
scheme provides higher level of securit-y at a- much
lower cost, both in term of key size and exlcution time.
The strength of the algorithm and the size of the
key used, play the main role in the security of digital
signature scheme. Fractal, RSA and DSA sihemes can
provide equal strength in security, all in terms of the
algorithm complexity and the key size used.
N_e_vertheless, fractal digital signature algorithm is more
efficient than RSA and DSA since theileorithm used
smaller key size and executes faster. N=ote that the
performance of the propose scheme is amplified further
in a multi-verification scenario, which is most likely to
happen in real implementation.
4 (l I):850-858.2007
Table 2: Key space cornparison between symmetric,
RSA and DSA schemest23l.
Symmetric scheme RSA/DSA
Key size Key size
80
n2
t28
192
256
r024
2048
3072
7680
l 5360
Table 3: Performance evaluation between Fractal based
digital signature and RSA digital signature
scheme.
Fractal, RSA and DSA Key gaces
1.50E+03
1.00E+03
5.00E+02
0.00E+00 Fraclals RSA DsA
cKeySpaceArerage 1,25E+03 1.765744481 1.765744481
Fig. 12: Key space comparison between fractal key, RSA and DSA
digital signatures implementation.
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Fig. l4: Fractal, RSA and DSA keys generation time.
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CONCLUSION
This paper shows the possibility of establishing a
fractal based digital sigrahre, derived from the logical
connection between the Mandelbrot and Julia fractal
sets. The security protection of the proposed fractal
digital signature depends partially on the number of
ite-rations-needed to convert the initial value c in the
Mandelbrot fractal equation to the starting value of z in
Julia fractal equation. Adding the key e md d during
the iteration of Mandelbrot and Julia firnctions will
establish the needed complexity of the proposed
scheme. As a result, the proposed sigrrature scheme
requires small key size and performs faster when
compared to RSA and DSA.
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